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Abstract
Background: The primary reason cited by many scholars for the defeat of the Clinton Administration’s 1994 health
care reform bill has long been identified as Health Insurance Association of America and National Federation of
Independent Businesses opposition to the bill. Given this predominant consensus combined with sizeable proposed
funding for the bill by a large tobacco product tax, this manuscript examined what the tobacco industry’s role was
in whole or part in defeating the Clinton health care bill.
Methods: This research occurred through crosschecking internal tobacco industry documents and Clinton White
House documents.
Results: Prior to the passage of the bill, the tobacco industry accepted a compromise of 45 cents per pack increase
phased in over five years. Due to this compromise, the industry or third party allies had no role in the ultimate
defeat in the bill.
Conclusions: The primary reason for the bill’s ultimate defeat was general business (but not tobacco industry and
third party ally) opposition, the bill running out of time, and conflicting bills. Secondary reasons for the bill’s defeat
included issues with: employer mandates, high taxes on insurance plans, impacts on medical research and
education, Congressional attention to other issues, election year politics, and possible future excise tax possibilities.
Keywords: Bill Clinton, 1994 health care reform, Corporate lobbying, Tobacco industry, Congress, White House
Background
What role did the tobacco industry and other corpora-
tions play in contributing to the defeat of the Clinton
administration’s effort to reform the U.S. health care sys-
tem under the 1994 Health Security Act (HSA)? The im-
petus for health care reform was the containment of
soaring health care costs for employees during the 1980s
that was being paid and absorbed by numerous em-
ployers [1–4]. The major provisions of the proposed
HSA included universal coverage except undocumented
persons, state and regional private health insurance pur-
chasing alliances, subsidies to individuals to pay for
health care, minimum health care benefit packages ap-
proved by federal law, and regulatory oversight of pre-
mium price increases by private insurers [1–5].
The primary reason the bill was defeated according to
many scholars was vigorous business opposition, in par-
ticular, from the Health Insurance Association of Amer-
ica (HIAA) and National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) [1, 3, 6]. According to Quadango re-
garding medium health insurance company opposition:
‘The purchasing alliances would be similar to the
corporate purchasing coalitions of the 1980s and
dominated by the five largest health insurers: Aetna,
Prudential, MetLife, Cigna, and Travelers. However,
smaller specialty firms stood to lose 30 to 60 percent
of their business, and insurance agents would be put
out of business’ [2].
The HIAA also had a major ally in small businesses
represented by NFIB who opposed employer man-
dates and tax increases [2]. Numerous scholars have
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concluded that a range of ancillary factors also led to
the 1994 health care bill’s defeat. These factors in-
cluded conservative opposition to higher taxes and
more government regulation, dragging out the process
allowing the opposition to organize, election year politics,
and health industry opposition to the plan [4, 7–10]. An-
other key opponent of the bill was the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturer’s Association, which argued
rising drug costs due to the legislation would stifle re-
search, prevent new drugs from entering the market, and
were already reasonably priced [11].
Almost all scholarly research has concluded that the
tobacco industry has had little or no influence in defeat-
ing the 1994 health care bill [7–10]. However, so far, one
peer reviewed article has concluded that the tobacco in-
dustry did have an important impact [12]. The overall
conclusion of the role and impact of the tobacco indus-
try’s effort to defeat the health care according to the au-
thors of this paper was, ‘…the tobacco industry credited
itself with a significant role for the defeat of the bill [12].
This was accomplished, according to this article, by mo-
bilizing ideologically diverse third parties to oppose the
Clinton plan. As Tesler and Malone [12] wrote:
The tobacco industry’s success in mobilizing
opposition to the Clinton plan among ideologically
diverse constituencies underscores the challenge of
overcoming corporate efforts to obstruct health care
reform [12]
The authors also noted, in particular, that the tobacco
industry opposed a higher tobacco excise tax funding
provision to pay for the 1994 health care legislation and
noted that multiple other factors contributed to the bill’s
defeat [12]. Given this difference between most scholars
who argue it was primarily the HIAA and NFIB and the
one paper concluding the tobacco industry has a signifi-
cant role and impact in defeating the Clinton health re-
form bill, this paper will further analyze and clarify this
question.
In order to shed new light on this question this paper
will utilize tobacco industry internal documents as well
as Clinton White House documents to determine what
role the tobacco industry had in defeating the 1994
health care legislation. This paper is the first to use
Clinton White House records to crosscheck tobacco in-
dustry documents to determine the role, if any, of the
tobacco industry in the defeat of Clinton’s 1994 Health
Security Act.
Methods
This paper examined all of the fully quoted text in the
tobacco documents between November 1993 and
November 1994 that directly describes significant final
conclusions on why the health care bill was defeated.
Significant final conclusion for the paper is defined as,
the final summarization as contained in a document of
why the health care bill was defeated. This time period
was chosen because the bill was introduced in Congress
on 22 November 1993 and encompassed the months in
which Congress deliberated on the bill, which was
defeated in September 1994 as well as any analyses after
the bill was defeated [1, 3, 7–10].
Data collection was performed by searching the more
than 80 million pages of previously internal tobacco in-
dustry documents obtained in the settlement of State of
Minnesota, et al. v. Phillip Morris, et al. (No.C1–94-
8565, 2nd District, Minnesota) and other subsequent liti-
gation against the tobacco industry. Under the terms of
the settlement, five tobacco companies, a tobacco trade
association, and a tobacco industry research council
established searchable web sites for these documents. This
material was accessed on the Internet at the University of
California, San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents
web site, which has integrated the various tobacco indus-
try web sites (https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucs
f.edu/tobacco/). Using the search term “health care” and
Clinton within the specified time period there were 4091
“hits.” This Boolean search phrase was selected so the
search engine would identify all available documents from
the entire text of the tobacco documents related to the
1994 Clinton health bill. Ultimately, 26 files provided per-
tinent references that directly described significant tobacco
company final conclusions on why the bill was defeated.
A search of the tobacco documents was also con-
ducted to determine if the tobacco industry had
quietly worked through third party allies to defeat the
bill (Table 1). Often, corporate lobbying can be oblique
with indirect lobbying by an industry like tobacco be-
ing conducted indirectly through other allied groups
that have been instrumental in ultimately defeating or
enacting a bill. Based on prior research, a corporate
lobby that opposed the bill entirely was the HIAA.
This paper also reveals from the Clinton era documents
that a coalition of corporate lobbies opposing the bill in-
cluded: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer’s
Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NFIB, National
Association of Manufacturers, Business Roundtable,
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act Industry
Committee [13]. The following table summarizes the
search results.
Data collection was performed for Clinton Presidential
documents by searching online declassified docu-
ments that included references to tobacco and the
Health Security Act of 1994 that directly described
significant final conclusions on why the health care
bill was defeated. This material was accessed on the
Givel BMC Public Health  (2017) 17:591 Page 2 of 8
Internet at the Clinton Digital Library web site at: http://
clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collection-tree. The ap-
proach used in the examination of these documents
provided by an archivist to this author at the Clinton
Library included examining: the “Domestic Policy Council
Collections - http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collec
tions/show/24 - especially Chris Jennings HSA collection
(http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collections/show/51)
Elena Kagan Collection - http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/
collections/show/34. Previously Restricted Documents
Collections http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collec
tions/show/43. The search term suggested by the archivist
and used was: “tobacco and Health Security Act” produ-
cing 49 “hits.” This Boolean search phrase was selected
so the search engine would identify all available docu-
ments related to final conclusions why the 1994 Clinton
bill was defeated.
Empirical coding of the universal set of qualitative data
in the tobacco and Clinton documents that referenced
significant final conclusions for the defeat of Clinton
health bill and possible tobacco industry linkages with
corporate third parties was accomplished using NVIVO
9.0 qualitative data analysis software produced by QSR
International Inc. All pertinent documents that were un-
covered are cited in this paper and included in the refer-
ence section. After a content analysis of the tobacco
documents and the Clinton White House occurred to
ascertain the role, if any, of the tobacco industry and
third party organizations it utilized in the defeat of the
Clinton health care bill, the major conclusion from these
two sets of documents was crosschecked with each
other. The method used in this archival research paper
to counter subjectivity bias is the audit trail approach.
As noted above this provides a clear depiction of the
research steps taken including the reporting of findings,
which a third party can replicate and analyze for them-
selves [14].
Results
Based on the coded internal tobacco industry documents
between January 1993 and November 1994 that directly
reference the tobacco tax increase to fund the health care
bill, there were a myriad of complex reasons from the
perspective of tobacco firms that led to the defeat of the
1994 health care legislation (Fig. 1) [15–41]. With respect
to the role of the tobacco industry in the health care bill’s
defeat, from January to June 1994, several references in
the tobacco documents indicate that the industry origi-
nally opposed any tobacco tax increase [24–26, 38, 39].
This was due to an initial proposal by the Clinton Admi-
nistration of taxing tobacco at two dollars a pack, which
was also reflected in a January 1993 report: Tobacco Use:
An American Crisis emanating from a conference co-
sponsored by the American Medical Association, City of
Hope National Medical Center, CDC, Coalition on
Smoking or Health, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center, and University of Texas Anderson Cancer Center
[42]. A May 1994 Philip Morris document also indicated
that prior to July 1994 Philip Morris was involved in a
corporate coalition with ‘National Association of
Manufacturers, Citizens for Tax Justice, and others’ to op-
pose any tobacco tax increase [43].
However, eight references in tobacco documents from
July to September 1994 indicate that the industry ac-
cepted a political compromise based on 45 cents per
pack tobacco increase phased in over five years [19–22].
As a representative Philip Morris internal document tri-
umphantly concluded:
‘…it is no coincidence that the politics have forced the
level down from the proposed one time increase of
$2.00 per pack to the current proposal of a 45¢
increase phased in over five years. While our
opponents never miss a chance to promote their
positions with the media, we have aggressively but
quietly worked the pressure points because, in the
end, it is votes that count not ink. In many ways, the
excise tax fight has been a case study of combining
our Washington talent and experience with our
corporate resources to achieve the best possible
outcome for the company’ [21].
The industry’s strategy to scale back the initial $2.00 a
pack proposal to a .45-cent increase over five years in-
cluded the following:
‘Our federal excise tax strategy was based on several
key assumptions. (C) First, a far less ambitious and
Table 1 Legacy tobacco document search results for relevant
tobacco industry and corporate ally documents from 22
November 1993 to 31 December 1994 to defeat Clinton health
care bill




“Health Insurance Association of America”
and Clinton
38 0
“National Federation of Independent
Businesses” and Clinton
49 0
“U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Clinton; 0 0
“National Association of Manufacturers”
and Clinton
65 0
“Association of Private Pension and
Welfare Plans” and Clinton
3 0
“Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturer’s Association” and Clinton
0 0
“Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Industry Committee” and Clinton
0 2
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consequently less costly package would give the Tax
Committees more flexibility in terms of financing.
This would give us room to maneuver on the tobacco
tax. To impact that debate, we organized intense
grassroots efforts targeting swing Democratic
Members arguing against wholesale changes to the
health care system. Efforts at the grassroots level
eventually deadlocked key Committees and forced the
Congress to retreat from the costly Clinton plan.
(C) And, with the House and Senate leadership
initially depending on Democrats alone to pass
legislation, the Democratic tobacco-voting bloc's
leverage was significantly increased. We constantly
worked to maintain the solidarity and intensity of
their efforts. And as southern Democrats, their
reelection difficulties were not lost on their
leadership.
(C) Finally, our strategy was to win the issue in the
House by concentrating our activities in the House
Ways and Means Committee which would act first on
the tax. Winning in the House would provide Senate
Majority Whip Wendell Ford with an 'anchor' and a
greater ability to negotiate in the Senate where our
support is much weaker’ [21].
This was accomplished in the following manner1:
‘Throughout the year, our lobbying activities have
included organizing Hill activities for labor and
tobacco grower organizations, creating a grower
advertising campaign, working with anti-tax groups to
oppose excise taxes, funding several economic
analyses suggesting alternative financing mechanisms,
and developing and implementing an anti-excise tax
grassroots campaign lead by those interests who have
a direct economic stake in the outcome’ [21].
Since the industry did eventually accept a tobacco tax
increase to fund the Clinton health proposal, the tobacco
documents also provide nine reasons why the industry
believed the Clinton health proposal died [17, 37].
These reasons included election year politics [32, 34],
Congressional attention to other issues [32, 34], lack
of time for passage [34, 37], lack of cost estimates for
alternative plans [21, 37], and conservative opposition
[21, 27, 30, 34, 40]. Other key reasons that played a key
role in the defeat of the Bill included opposition to em-
ployer mandates [15], higher future taxes [28, 29, 31, 33],
and taxes on insurance plans [34]. Finally, the documents
also illustrate that RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris, by far
the two largest tobacco companies, did not think the 1994
legislation was necessarily dead and could well be revived
in the 1995 session of Congress [17, 36]. As a November
1994 RJ Reynolds document explained:
‘Assumptions
 The Administration will bring forth another
National Health Care Plan in 1995.
 “Clintoncare II” will begin being drafted between
now and year-end, and will be completed early in
the session. The President will speak to Health Care
in his State of the Union Address as a goal for the
‘95 session.
 Changes in the makeup of the Senate and the
House will make it more difficult to get massive,
government-run Health Care Plan passed. Therefore,
the plan will be less ambitious than “Clintoncare I,”
perhaps in over several years. Some of the more
controversial aspects, such as employer mandates,
regional alliances, etc., could be eliminated, thereby
appeasing some of the opponents that lined up against
the Plan in 1994. If that’s the case, we lose many of
the allies we had in ‘94.
 Universal coverage remains the goal’ [41].
An October 1994 Philip Morris document also noted
in detail:
‘Early this summer (1994), the Senate Finance and the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committees
favorably reported their versions of health care
reform, and both Committees proposed a total tax
increase of $1.00 per pack. Tobacco-state Democrats
nonetheless were able to use their leverage as the
congressional leadership searched for floor votes and
incorporated the ‘45 cents over 5 years’ proposal into
all final leadership bills. However, due to election year
politics and intense opposition to comprehensive
health care legislation, neither the House nor the
Senate held floor votes on a health care package
resulting in no tax increase in the 103rd Congress.
The Administration is already revamping its health
care proposal for reintroduction in the 104th
Congress, and indications are that it will call for
increased tobacco taxes to fund it’ [35].
Election year politics included, in particular, Republican
opposition to national health reform as a key strategy of
retaking Republican control of the Congress since the
1950s [44].
Clinton White House documents
Previously secret and now declassified White House
documents from 1993 to late 1994 present a clear pic-
ture of the extent and nature of the role of the tobacco
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tax in the defeat or not of the Health Security Act of
1994 [45–71]. In May 1993, First Lady Hillary Clinton
and Miles Coggans, Special Assistant to the President
on Agriculture, met with Senator Wendell H. Ford
(D-Kentucky) to discuss the impact and a possible ap-
proach of mitigating the Administration’s proposed
two dollar a pack increase in tobacco taxes to fund
the Health Security Act of 1994 [50]. Before that
meeting, an internal Administration memo noted:
‘An increase of $2.00 per pack of 20 in the federal
excise tax would reduce U.S. cigarette consumption
by 25 to 40 percent from 500 billion to 300 to 375
billion cigarettes. As a result, U.S. tobacco production
could fall as much as 30 percent. To soften the
impact of the decline in U.S. tobacco production, a
proposal has been made to pay quota owners to retire
unneeded quotas’ [50].
By December 1993, the Clinton Administration pro-
posed that funding for the Health Security Act of 1994
come from a tobacco tax, Medicare and Medicare
freezes and savings, corporate assessments, miscellan-
eous revenue gains, and savings in other federal pro-
grams [45–49, 51–55, 68].
In March 1994, following a meeting with Hillary
Clinton and senior White House advisors, Carol Rasco,
White House domestic policy advisor requested that
Marion Berry, Agriculture Special Assistant to the
President and Chris Jennings, White House health policy
advisor work together on alternatives to the current
funding proposal [57]. The purpose of this was to review
Administration alternatives in light of members of
Congress raising concerns about the amount of the pro-
posed tobacco tax [57]. On the table for analysis was to-
bacco import quota or tariff relief such as the proposed
Ford Amendment that limited foreign tobacco sales in
the U.S. to 25% of the market and increased tariffs on
imported foreign tobacco [57]. Another alternative that
was analyzed was raising the tobacco excise tax from
.24 cents to one dollar a pack instead of two dollars a
pack. Related to this meeting and the current tobacco tax
proposal an internal White House memo noted:
‘The tobacco industry obviously feels mistreated
because of the single nature of the above taxes. Other
taxes have been discussed with the President and he
rejected them at the time. Some of these are taxes on
various alcoholic beverages and soft drinks. They are
still a possibility and would definitely soften the blow
to the tobacco interests’ [57].
By June to July 1994, discussions by members of
Congress and congressional committees regarding
substantially reducing the proposed tobacco tax amount
continued [58–60]. On 20 July 1994, Hillary Clinton met
with 21 Democratic members of the U.S. House who
were both supportive and ‘swing’ members to ensure
their support of the Health Security Act [61]. Two issues
that several in the group wished to have addressed were
abortions and the tobacco tax [61]. Despite the concerns
expressed at the meeting, the proposed tobacco tax ten-
tatively remained at one dollar a pack [62, 63].
However and after the meeting, by July 25, 1994 the
proposed tobacco tax had dropped from two dollars to
one dollar to .45 cents a pack [62, 63]. Under the new
proposal, funding was to come from a reduced tobacco
tax, increased Medicaid and Medicare freezes and sav-
ings, corporate assessments, miscellaneous revenue
gains, and savings in other federal programs [66].
After the compromise to reduce the tobacco tax to
45 cents a pack, in August 1994, a White House memo
outlined numerous key issues other than tobacco that
business interests had with the Health Security Act [13].
The memo noted:
‘I (Caren Wilcox) am continuing to work with the few
elements of the large business community who remain
committed to improving the bill sufficiently enough in
the Senate that they believe a good bill could emerge
from conference (committee). However, even these
companies are expressing discouragement or concern.
In addition, the small business coalition remains a
constant support, but they have two issues of
importance: the definition of the self employed, and the
equal pricing issue for drugs sold to pharmacies’ [13].
In addition to individual business opposition from
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer’s Association
and HIAA, another corporate coalition that opposed the
bill in its entirety was: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
NFIB, National Association of Manufacturers, Business
Roundtable, Association of Private Pension and Welfare
Plans, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Industry Committee [11, 13]. In particular the business
coalition opposition focused on several issues with the bill
including financing, multi-state issues, cost containment
and managed care, cafeteria plans tax, independent con-
tractors and self-employed issues, local pharmacy issues,
and technical amendments to clarify the bill [13]. With
respect to the financing issue:
‘Companies which offer insurance now, find it difficult
to swallow a complete carve out for businesses with
under 25 employees, on top of premiums already
being voluntarily paid. They are concerned that this
carve out will also lead to a cost shift in the system
which will cause their premiums to go up’ [13].
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Besides technical amendments, business opponents
were concerned with, ‘Multi-state companies with uni-
form national standard company packages losing that
standard, less than rigorous cost containment provisions
to reverse increasing premium increases, and cafeteria
benefit plans allowing benefits options and containing
costs being replaced by pre-determined premiums’ [13].
Also, business opponents opposed the change in defin-
ition of an employee to include independent contractors
who would be covered with increased health premium
costs under the proposed law as well as small pharma-
cies concerned about equal treatment for wholesale pri-
cing from large pharmaceutical manufacturers [13].
‘By October 1994, and after the defeat of the Health
Security Act, a White House memo concluded:
The reforms we are considering can be categorized in
three ways: (1) coverage protections for the currently
insured, (2) access to insurance guarantees for all, and
(3) market-based approaches to promote desirable
competition among insurers. All three of these
categories have been the focus of major pieces of
legislation (Bentsen, Mitchell, Gephardt, Chafee, Dole,
Rowland/Bilirakis, Cooper, and others) throughout the
last two Congresses.
Although complex, the issues are not new. However,
while most bills appear to have many of the same
goals, the approaches and potential consequences vary
widely.
The challenge of pursuing any insurance reform agenda
is to ensure that it will be drafted and implemented
correctly. If not, we risk not only unacceptably
disrupting the current market and raising premiums to
particularly influential constituencies, but undermining
public confidence in our ability to move forward with
future reforms. If we succeed in passing a strong set of
reforms, we can make real and positive change to our
currently quite flawed insurance market’ [13].
Discussion
In summary, the White House clearly identified general
business opposition to the Health Security Act along
with running out of time and sub-optimal, weak, and
conflicting bills as the primary reasons for the ultimate
demise of the Health Security Act. Not included due to
the earlier compromise of 45 cents a pack was ideologic-
ally diverse third party organizations allied with or uti-
lized by the tobacco industry.
Conclusion
The Clinton White House and tobacco industry docu-
ments indicate the primary reason for the health reform
bill’s defeat was widespread business opposition to the
legislation, but not the tobacco industry (or its third
party organizational allies), which accepted a comprom-
ise 45 cents per pack increase phased in over five years
to pay for the bill. Additionally, as noted in the tobacco
industry document searches providing possible linkages
between the tobacco industry and other businesses in
defeating the bill (Table 1); the best available evidence is
minimal that such linkages existed in a significant man-
ner before and particularly after the 45 cents a pack
compromise. This conclusion of business opposition as
well as other factors leading to the bill’s defeat is in sync
with a vast majority of historical analyses of the failed
1994 Clinton health bill. As shown in this paper, other
factors included issues with: expanded employer man-
dates, bill running out of time, conflicting bills, employer
mandates, higher taxes on insurance plans, impact on
medical research and education, Congressional attention
to other issues, election year politics, and possible future
excise tax possibilities.
A primary lesson learned for anti-tobacco advocates
related to the lack of a role of the tobacco industry in
the ultimate defeat of the health bill is that advocacy
strategies and tactics can change at any point in the pol-
icy process. The tobacco industry’s early mobilization in
tandem with third party allies ended prior to the defeat
of the bill due to the 45 cents a pack political comprom-
ise. Anti-tobacco advocates need to carefully and con-
tinually document and assess such corporate or any
other alliances with the industry throughout a policy
process in anti-tobacco campaigns, but never assume
such alliances exist at any point without hard evidence.
Moreover, the tobacco industry was pressured to agree
to a modest 45 cents a pack tax compromise in lieu of
earlier legislative proposals of much higher tobacco pack
tax increases. Thus, another primary lesson learned is
that the industry can be pressured to settle for a com-
promise by starting from a position of negotiating
strength when it sees the compromise in its interest and
even contrary to more robust corporate profits. While
the impact of tobacco use in the U.S. remains a signifi-
cant preventable public health issue with over 480,000
annual deaths due to smoking and secondhand smoke
this can be countered by higher tobacco taxes [72]. The
compromise of 45 cents a pack would have been a mod-
est victory for public health. Thus, anti-tobacco advo-
cates should always be cognizant of their ultimate goal
of reducing tobacco use when advocating or negotiating
for compromises with the industry or others such as
occurred with the Clinton health bill.
This study has the following limitations. Other evi-
dence or documents could be available beyond this study
documenting further insights into the policy advocacy of
third party organizations in alliance with or utilized by
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the tobacco industry from 1993 to 1994. This could pro-
vide further information on the dynamics of the overall
policy making processes leading to the defeat of the
Clinton health bill. Similarly, there could be documents
outside of the 1993–1994 time frame of this research
that examined the legislative session in which the Clin-
ton health care bill was defeated. This could provide fur-
ther information and background on the dynamics of
the tobacco industry in league with third party organiza-
tions and their role with respect to the Clinton health
bill. Finally, while the methodology used in this study
crosschecked the data and conclusions using two separ-
ate data sources including a recommended search term
approach by an archivist at the Clinton Presidential
Library. It is possible with respect to on-line document
searches and due to the large number and types of docu-
ments in both archives there may be further relevant
documents.
Endnote
1In the article: 1. Tesler L, Malone R. “Our Reach is
Wide by Any Corproate Standard”: How the Tobacco
Industry Helped Defeat the Clinton Health Plan and
Why It Matters Now. American Journal of Public
Health. 2010;100 (7):1174–88., there is a detailed over-
view of this manufactured grassroots lobbying effort.
This eventually led to the 45 cents increase over five
years compromise agreed to by the tobacco industry in
August 1994.
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